Six 300,000-ton VLCCs to collectively reroute around the Cape of Good Hope!

Affected by the threat of the Houthi embargo on Saudi vessels, a fleet of six ultra-large oil tankers of 300,000 tons each, with a combined capacity of nearly 1.9 million deadweight tons, is embarking on a rare "long trek" along the African coast empty.

The latest track monitoring by maritime risk intelligence agency Windward shows that all six VLCCs flying the Saudi Arabian flag have abandoned passage through the Mandeb Strait and Red Sea routes, instead detouring around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa.

Five of these ships are heading to Corpus Christi and Southtex offshore transshipment areas on the U.S. Gulf Coast to load crude oil. Compared to sailing directly via the Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Suez Canal, a detour is expected to add about 6–7 days to each vessel's voyage.

The sixth ship, LAYNAH, had an even more remarkable detour. The vessel is returning from Taiwan, China, to Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port. Under normal circumstances, ships can cross the Indian Ocean and enter the Red Sea directly via the Mandeb Strait; After the detour, the route must continue southwest, rounding the Cape of Good Hope, then heading north along the Atlantic Ocean, passing through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean, and passing through the Suez Canal before reaching Yanbu. Windward estimates that the voyage will increase by about 30 days, extending the sailing time from the usual 24–26 days to 54–56 days—nearly doubling.

All six ships came from Bahri

Xinde Maritime Network's review of vessel tracking data from the same period further revealed the identities of these six VLCCs.

它们分别为: Digestion, Heart, Sin, Lina, Salaam 和Burqan.

All six ships belong to the fleet of Saudi National Shipping Company Bahri.

Among them, the "DILAM" and "GHINAH" ships were built in 2010, the "SALAM" in 2016, the "HAZM" in 2019, and the "LAYNAH" and "BURQAN" both in 2022, with single-ship deadweight tonnages ranging from approximately 300,000 to 320,000 tons. According to Bahri's official website, a single VLCC can typically carry about 2.2 million barrels of crude oil.

On July 31, Bloomberg was the first to disclose based on vessel tracking data that the "HAZM" and "DILAM" vessels declared their destination in the AIS system as Gibraltar; The "GHINAH," "LAYNAH," "SALAM," and "BURQAN" ships were declared to sail to Durban or Algoa Bay, South Africa.

Gibraltar, Durban, and the Algoa Bay are frequently used route nodes, refueling ports, or supply areas for large oil tankers circumnavigating Africa. These destination declarations show that six VLCCs have already adjusted their routes to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.

From ships built in 2010 to modern VLCCs delivered in 2022, there is a wide range of ages and technical status, yet they simultaneously take detours. This means the decision is more like an overall risk control measure for the Saudi-linked fleet, rather than a separate arrangement for the technical condition of a particular vessel.

All six ships were empty

The six VLCCs orbiting the Cape of Good Hope are already noteworthy, but what truly sends a strong risk signal is that they are all in ballast (ballast water, but actually cargo is empty).

Choosing a detour when a ship is fully loaded with crude oil is generally understood as the shipowner needing to protect cargo worth tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars, avoiding risks to ships, cargo, and environmental pollution.

Empty ships also choose to detour, but the logic has changed.

Ballast voyages do not involve crude oil cargo, and shipowners are still willing to bear additional sailing time, fuel consumption, schedule losses, and subsequent scheduling costs, indicating that risk assessment has extended from "what cargo is on board" to what flags the ship flies on, who owns and manages it, which ports it has called, and whether it has any connection to Saudi Arabia.

Based on this, Windward concluded that for Saudi-linked vessels, the Red Sea route is close to being "effectively closed." The flag and owner's background themselves are becoming important risk variables affecting whether ships can safely pass through the Mandeb Strait.

The Houthis "blockade" has begun to alter the actual flight routes

The direct background to this collective rerouting is the Houthis' announcement on July 20 of a "maritime blockade" against Saudi Arabia.

In a statement, the Houthis said they would immediately impose a maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition has labeled the threat as a violation of international law as "piracy," and stated that measures have begun to protect merchant ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

However, shipping companies will not decide whether to pass through high-risk waters solely based on political statements. Shipowners, charterers, insurance companies, and ship managers are more concerned about whether attack capabilities are real, whether target identification rules are clear, and whether insurance and military protection can be obtained in case of attack.

According to Windward data, since the Houthis announced the blockade on July 20, the average daily traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has dropped by about 22%; Cruiser traffic dropped by about 39%; Vessel traffic linked to Saudi Arabia dropped by about 46%, a significantly higher drop than other vessel groups.

This indicates that the Houthis' blockade statements are shifting from political threats to concrete ship scheduling decisions.

The Red Sea is forming a "selective passage"

It is worth noting that the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is not completely closed to all commercial vessels.

Windward stated that between July 20 and August 2, a total of 22 vessels linked to China passed through the Mandeb Strait and docked at Saudi ports, with no incidents; Meanwhile, four Saudi oil tankers were attacked at the same time window.

This difference is making the Red Sea increasingly characterized by "selective passage": some vessels from certain countries, flags, and ownership backgrounds can still keep AIS on and sail normally, while Saudi-linked tankers face significantly higher safety risks.

Therefore, it is difficult to simply summarize the current state of the Mandeb Strait as "open" or "closed." From the perspective of physical navigation conditions, ships still pass through; From a commercial and risk management perspective, this route has lost normal availability for some Saudi-linked vessels.

Six VLCCs under Bahri would rather sail empty for thousands of nautical miles, which is the market's most direct assessment of this risk environment.

Five empty ships detoured to the U.S., with an impact already exceeding Saudi crude oil exports

This detour also sends another noteworthy signal.

Five VLCCs heading to the U.S. Gulf of Mexico to load crude oil indicate that the scope of the Red Sea risk has gone beyond the single link of Saudi Arabia's crude oil exports from Yanbu Port, beginning to interfere with the Bahri fleet's empty vessel allocation in the global tanker market.

After unloading the cargo on a large tanker, it needs to move quickly to the next loading area. The shorter the ballast range, the more transport voyages the vessel can complete per unit time; The extended ballast voyage means ships need to invest more time before re-entering cargo transport status.

For these five VLCCs, an additional 6–7 days of ballast voyages means additional fuel consumption and operating expenses, as well as delays in the U.S. Bay loading window, subsequent unloading times, and the next voyage schedule.

The sixth VLCC returning from Taiwan to Yanbu requires about 30 more days of voyage, with a more pronounced commercial impact. An extra month of ballast time is almost equivalent to consuming a full ocean voyage cycle of a VLCC.

If more Saudi-linked VLCCs take similar actions, although the nominal fleet size in the tanker market remains unchanged, the effective capacity available for transport at specific times and locations will decrease. This "implicit capacity absorption" caused by detours and extended sailing times may further support VLCC freight rates.

Saudi Arabia's "Hormuz backup channel" has once again hit a bottleneck

The escalation of risks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait has deeper implications for Saudi Arabia's energy export system. If both the Mandeb and Hormuz Straits were blockaded, what impact would the shipping industry have?

After disruptions to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia is increasingly utilizing east-west cross-border crude oil pipelines to transport crude oil from the Persian Gulf side to the export of oil from Yanbu Port on the Red Sea coast.

This pipeline and Yanbu Port were originally important alternative solutions for Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. However, crude oil shipped from Yanbu to Asia still needs to travel south through the Mandeb Strait. If Saudi Arabian-linked oil tankers cannot safely use this channel, the related crude oil will need to bypass the Cape of Good Hope or rearrange exports north via the Suez Canal and Egypt's pipeline system.

Kpler data shows that since April 2026, Saudi Arabia has exported an average of over 4.5 million barrels of crude oil and refined products from Yanbu Port per day, with about 70% of that flowing to Asia. Analysts estimate that if the Mandeb Strait is effectively blocked, more than 3 million barrels per day of Saudi crude oil may be forced to take longer routes, and Asian refineries may delay receiving some of the extended crude oil by about a month.

The Strait of Hormuz has restricted Saudi Arabia's eastern exports, and the risk of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has begun to squeeze its Red Sea export routes. Saudi Arabia's bidirectional energy transport system, originally designed to disperse geopolitical risks, is now under pressure from two key straits simultaneously.

Source：Xinde Marine News